The vulnerabilities of deep neural networks against adversarial examples have become a major concern for deploying these models in sensitive domains. Devising a de nitive defense against such attacks is proven to be challenging, and the methods relying on detecting adversarial samples have been shown to be only e ective when the attacker is oblivious to the detection mechanism, i.e., in non-adaptive attacks. In this paper, we propose an e ective and practical method for detecting adaptive/dynamic adversaries. In short, we train adversary-robust auxiliary detectors to discriminate in-class natural examples from adversarially crafted out-of-class examples. To identify a potential adversary, we rst obtain the estimated class of the input using the classi cation system, and then use the corresponding detector to verify whether the input is a natural example of that class, or is an adversarially manipulated example. Experimental results on MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset show that our method could withstand adaptive PGD attacks. Furthermore, we demonstrate that with our novel training scheme our models learn signi cant more robust representation than ordinary adversarial training.
Introduction
Deep neural networks have become the staple of modern machine learning pipelines, achieving state-ofthe-art performance on extremely di cult tasks in various applications such as computer vision [1] , speech recognition [2] , machine translation [3] , robotics [4] , and biomedical image analysis [5] . Despite their outstanding performance, these networks are shown to be vulnerable against various types of adversarial attacks, including evasion attacks (aka, inference or perturbation attacks) [6, 7, 8, 9] and poisoning attacks [10, 11] . These vulnerabilities in deep neural networks hinder their deployment in sensitive domains including, but not limited to, health care, nances, autonomous driving, and defense-related applications and has become a major security concern. Due to these de ciencies there has been a recent surge toward designing defense mechanisms against adversarial attacks [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] , which has in turn motivated the design of stronger attacks that defeat the proposed defenses [7, 18, 19, 8, 20, 21, 22, 23] . In addition, the proposed defenses have been shown to be to limited and often not e ective and easy to overcome [21] . Alternatively, a large body of work has focused on detection of adversarial examples [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37] . While training robust classi er focuses on maintaining performance in presence of adversarial examples, adversarial detection only cares for detecting these examples.
The majority of the existing detection mechanism focus on non-adaptive attackers, for which the attacks are not speci cally tuned/tailored to bypass the detection mechanism and the attacker is oblivious to the detection mechanism. In fact, Carlini et al. [38] and Athalye et al. [21] showed that the detection methods presented in [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 35] , only apply to non-adaptive attacks and could not withstand adaptive adversarial attacks. In other words, their detection mechanisms could be easily bypassed by an attacker who has knowledge of the detection mechanism and could craft adversarial examples that are optimized to fool both the classi er/regressor and the detector. Figure 1 : A conceptual visualization of our divide-andconquer detection mechanism with adversary-robust detectors.
In this paper, we are interested in detection mechanisms for adversarial examples that can withstand adaptive attacks. Unlike previous approaches that assume adversarial and natural samples coming from di erent distributions, thus rely on using one classi er to distinguish between them, we instead based on the classi cation system's output to partition the input space into subspaces, and perform adversarial/natural sample classi cation in subspaces. Importantly, the partition allow us to drop the adversarial constrain and employ the adversarial robust optimization objective [16] to train robust classi ers in each subspace. Although similar, our approach di ers from standard adversarial training in that each subspace classi er essentially models the distribution of that class's natural samples (but not adversarial examples), and thus is able to learn more robust and interpretable features that could generalize better to potentially stronger attacks. Although we only demonstrate robustness to adaptive PGD attacks, the fact that our models learn robust representation that align better with human perception promises as much, if not more, than ordinary adversarial training. Figure 1 demonstrates the concept of our hardened detectors against attacks.
Related works
Adversarial attacks Since the pioneering work of Szegedy et al. [6] , a large body of work has focused on designing algorithms that achieve e ective attacks [7, 39, 18, 22, 40, 8] . More recently, iterative projected gradient descent (PGD), originally proposed by Kurakin et al. [18] , has been empirically identi ed as the most e ective approach for performing norm ball constrained attacks [16] , and the attack can reasonably approximate the optimal attack. Compared to ordinary graident descent, PGD needs one more step to project the result to the feasible set as de ned by the norm ball: x n+1 = Proj x +S (x n − γ · ∇f (x n )).
Detection techniques Several adversary detection methods have been proposed in recent years. The majority of these detection methods are based on the following general idea: given a trained K-class classi er, f : R d → {1...K }, and its corresponding clean training samples,
, generate a set of adversarially attacked samples D = {x j ∈ R d } M j=1 , and devise a mechanism to discriminate D from D . For instance, Gong et al. [26] use this exact idea and learn a binary classi er to distinguish the natural and adversarially perturbed sets. Similarly, Grosse et al. [27] append a new "attacked" class to the classi er, f , and re-train a secured network that classi es clean images, x ∈ D, into the K class and all attacked images, x ∈ D to the (K + 1)'th class. In contrast to [26, 27] , which aim at detecting adversarial examples directly from the image content, Metzen et al. [28] trained a binary classi er that receives as input the features from intermediate layers of the classi er network, f , and distinguished D from D . More importantly, Metzen et al. [28] considered the so called case of adaptive/dynamic adversary and proposed to harden the detector against attacks using a similar adversarial training approach as in [7] . Unfortunately, all the above mentioned detection methods fail under an adaptive adversary equipped with a strong attack [38, 21] . Di erent from the above approach, Zheng et al. [36] model the class conditional distribution of network hidden states using Gaussian Mixture Models, and detect adversarial examples based on likelihood scores. The statistics of network hidden states are computed from natural samples, thus their method generalizes better to di erent attacks. But their density models are not actively adversarial trained, thus is not robust to white-box attacks.
Detection method
For a K(K ≥ 2) class classi cation problem, given a dataset of natural samples
..K } be the classi er that is used to do classi cation on D. With the labels and predicted labels the dataset respectively forms the partition D = D k and
1} be a set of binary classi ers (detectors), in which h k is trained to discriminate natural samples classi ed as k, from adversarial samples that fool to be classi ed as k. Let D be a set of p norm bounded adversarial examples crafted from D:
Consider the following procedure to determine whether a sample x in D ∪ D is an adversary:
First obtain the estimated class label k = f (x), then use the k-th detector to predict: if h k (x) = 0 then x is an adversarial sample, otherwise it's a natural sample.
The detection accuracy of the algorithm is given by
where
Thus minimizing the algorithm's classi cation error is equivalent to minimizing classi cation error of individual detectors. Employing empirical risk minimization, detector k, parameterized by θ k , is trained by
where L is the binary cross-entropy loss.
In the case of adaptive attacks, adversaries are crafted to fool both the classi er and detectors, and accuracy of a naively trained detector (using 2) could be signi cantly reduced. In order to be robust to adaptive attacks, it's necessary to incorporate the attack into the training objective: based on the idea of adversarial robust optimization [16] , detector k is instead trained by
k, x ∈ D}, and we have assumed perturbation budget is large enough:
we could instead drop the f (x + δ ) = k constrain and optimize the unconstrained objective
Further, we use the fact that when D is used as training set f could over t such that D \k = {x i : i k } and D k are respectively good approximations of D f \k and D f k . This leads to the following objective
In a nutshell, each detector is trained using in-class natural examples and detector-adversaries crafted from out-of-class samples. The rst term in the nal objective is similar to the one in Madry et al. [16] and iterative PGD attack is currently the most e ective approach for solving the inner optimization.
Threat model
We assume the detector has full knowledge of the classi cation and detection system (i.e., white-box access to f and {h k } K k =1 ). To mount a successful untargeted attack, the attacker would have to rst obtain the predicted label of the adversary, then try to overcome the corresponding detector. Thus the untargeted scheme boils down to an adaptive targeted attack, and we need to show that all our detectors could withstand such attacks. Referring to objective 3, to test detector k, with the goal of fooling both f and
Note that although we focus on testing individual detectors, in a real-world scenario the attacker could bring down overall detection performance on a set of adversaries by assigning each adversary to its most vulnerable detector.
To realize such attacks, we consider two optimization methods. For the rst we follow CW [38] : to attack on class k, we use detector k's output logit z(h k )∈ R (where z(h k ) < 0 indicates detection of an attack) and the classi er logits z(f ) to construct a surrogate classi er with its output logits, z( ) ∈ R K +1 , being:
The new class, K + 1, indicates detection of an attack. With the attacking goal k, an adversarial example x is crafted by minimizing the following loss function
We observe that the optimization tends to stuck at the point where z(f (x )) k keeping changing signs while z(h k ) staying as a large negative number (which indicates detection).
To derive a more e ective attack we consider a more straightforward objective:
In short, if x has not yet been classi ed as k, optimize it for that goal; otherwise optimize it for fooling the detector. These two loss functions are optimized using iterative PGD attacks.
Experiments
Testing schemes In principle, models trained with objective 5 should be tested with objective 4, if the classi er f is not perfect on test set. That is, to test detector k, we use test samples D Next we test against the threat model (referred as adaptive-adv). The test scenario is a correspondence to objective 3, and is described in Section 4. Again for MNIST dataset we use D \k and D k in place of D PGD attack implementation At each step of PGD attack adversaries are updated using gradient descent. In presence of vanishing gradient when optimizing against the cross-entropy loss, normalized steepest gradient descent, with its 2 and ∞ update rule being x n+1 = x n −γ ∇f (x n ) ∇f (x n ) 2 and x n+1 = x n −γ ·sign(∇f (x n )), is more e ective than standard gradient descent [16] . Another popular choice is using Adam [42] optimizer but optimizing with respect to model's logit output [8] . On MNIST dataset our training adversaries are optimized using Adam, but adversaries optimized with both approaches are tested. On CIFAR10 we only use normalized steepest gradient descent.
Performance metric We use AUC (area under the ROC Curve) to measure detection performances. The metric could be interpreted as the probability that the detector assigns a higher score to a random positive sample than to a random negative example. A random detector has a AUC score of 0.5 while a perfect one has score of 1.0. Training We use 50K samples from the original training set for training and the rest 10K samples for validation, and report test performances based on the epoch-saved checkpoint that gives the best validation performance. All detectors are trained using a network consisting of two max-pooled convolutional layers each with 32 and 64 lters, and a fully connected layer of size 1024, same as the one used in [16] . At each iteration we sample a batch of 320 samples, from which in-class samples are used as positive samples, and out-of-class samples are used as the source for adversaries that will be used as negative samples. To balance positives and negatives at each batch, we resample the out-of-class set to have same number of samples as in-class set. Using di erent 2 , ∞ , and ϵ combinations we trained four models, with training and validation adversaries optimized using PGD attacks of di erent steps and step size (see Table 1 for details). At each step of PGD attack we use the Adam optimizer to perform gradient descent, both for 2 and ∞ constrained optimizations. All models are trained for 100 epochs.
MNIST experiments

Results
In Table 2 our models exhibit robustness to adversaries crafted using much stronger PGD attacks, for both Adam and normalized steepest gradient descent based attacks. We note in Table 9 attacking with multiple random starts doesn't decrease model robustness signi cantly. In Table 4 we report the detection performances of ∞ trained models under various testing schemes. In detector-adv test, large perturbation model (ϵ = 0.5) seems to perform worse than small perturbation model (ϵ = 0.3), but in fact it is much more e ective (at detecting adversaries). To see this, we rst notice that training with large perturbation does not deteriorate model performances on natural examples much (the natural test). Second, the cross-perturbation test in Table 3 shows that, for detecting small perturbation adversaries, large perturbation models perform almost as well as small perturbation models, but for detecting large perturbation adversaries, small perturbation model performs much worse. Figure 4 gives some hints: adversaries took full advantage of the perturbation limit and transformed to the appearance of target class; even for human eyes they are hard to detect.
Adaptive attacks using 8 is more e ective (lower AUC scores) than using 7. In theory adaptive attacks should underperform the test scheme (adaptive-adv vs. detector-adv) because the latter is unconstrained optimization. We observe that this is not the case when perturbation limits are large (ϵ = 0.5 and ϵ = 5.0). We speculate that when the search space is large, rst performing targeted attacks (as in 8) o ers some bene ts for approaching the optimal.
We observed that all models are able to detect static adversaries perfectly. Large perturbation samples in Figure 3 show that our models learn signi cant more robust features than standard adversarial training. Table 3 : AUC scores of cross-norm and cross-perturbation attacks for models of the rst two classes. Scores for models trained with larger perturbations but tested with smaller ones are highlighted. Training We train our CIFAR10 detectors using the ResNet model [1, 16] . To speedup training, we take advantage of a natural trained classi er: the subnetwork of f that de nes the output logit z(f (·)) k is essentially a "detector", that would output high values for samples of class k, and low values for others. Our detector is then trained by netuning the subnetwork using objective 5. Our pretrained classi er has a test accuracy of 95.01% (fetched from the CIFAR10 adversarial challenge [43] ).
CIFAR10 experiments
At each iteration of training we sample a batch of 300 samples, from which in-class samples are used as positives, while an equal number of out-of-class samples are used as sources for adversaries. Adversaries for training 2 and ∞ models are both optimized using PGD attack with normalized steepest gradient descent [44] . PGD attack settings for training our models are detailed in Table 5 . We report results based on the best performances on the CIFAR10 test set (thus don't claim generalization performance of the proposed method). Results The ϵ = 2.0 model histories in Figure 2 show that by adversarial netuning the model reach adversarial robustness in a few thousands of iterations, without sacri cing performance on natural samples (test nat AUC starts from 0.9971, ends at 0.9981). Adversarial training on the ϵ = 8.0 model didn't converge after an extended 20K iterations of training. The gap between train adv AUC and test adv AUC of the latter is more pronounced, and we observed a decrease of test nat AUC from 0.9971 to 0.9909.
We found training with adversaries optimized with a small enough step size to be essential for model robustness. In table 6 we tested two ∞ , ϵ = 2.0 models respectively trained with 0.5 and 1.0 step sizes. The step size 1.0 model is not robust when tested with a much smaller step size. We observe that when training the model, training set adv AUC reached 1.0 in less than one hundred iterations, but test set natural AUC plummeted to around 0.95 and couldn't recover thereafter.
The rst two tables in 7 demonstrate model robustness to stronger attacks under the same norm constrain. Although the AUC score of the ∞ , ϵ = 8.0 model is signi cantly lower, the last table show that the model exhibits robustness to smaller perturbation attacks, for both 2 and ∞ attacks, and the robustness is comparable to that of models trained with smaller perturbations. In fact, training with a large perturbation helps the model to learn more robust features (see Figure 5 ). Again in Table 9 attacking the CIFAR10 models with multiple random starts doesn't decrease model robustness. Similar to the MNIST result, Table 8 show that adaptive attacks using objective 8 is more e ective, but the attack didn't outperform the unconstrained optimization (adaptive-adv vs. detector-adv). While on average models are able to maintain performances on natural examples after adversarial netuning ( natural vs. natural-start), their adversarial robustness has been dramatically improved (static-adv vs. static-adv-start). We note that by comparing adaptive-adv with static-adv the models are in fact not performing worse; the dataset for performing these two test are di erent (see Section 5) .
In consistent with the MNIST result, Figure 5 show that our ∞ , ϵ = 8.0 model learn signi cant more interpretable features than the adversarial trained classi er. 
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a novel method for detecting adaptive adversarial examples. The idea is to partition the input space in such a way that adversarial robust optimization could be employed to train robust detector in each subspace. Our models are able to withstand adaptive PGD attacks on MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset, and learn signi cantly more robust representation than adversarial trained classi er. We also proposed a stronger adaptive attack objective, and explored a novel technique for speeding up adversarial training. Currently we need to train a separate detector for each and every class; in future work we will explore the possibility of shared computation or even using a single classi cation network to realize the same functionality. . The rst group of adversaries are optimized using 2 PGD attacks with step size 10.0, while the second group ∞ PGD attacks with step size 0.5. All samples in these two groups respectively reach the same 2 perturbation of 1200 and ∞ perturbation of 32.0. Adversaries are crafted by attacking the corresponding logit output. Madry et al. [16] adv classi er also trained with ∞ , ϵ = 8.0 constrain.
